Negotiation in SMEs’ environment analysis with game theory tools by Valencik, Radim & Cervenka, Jan
 European Research Studies Journal 
Volume XXI, Issue 1, 2018    
 pp. 104 - 114 
   
Negotiation in SMEs’ Environment Analysis with Game 
Theory Tools 
  
     Radim Valenčík1, Jan Červenka2 
 
 
     
Abstract:  
 
The contribution deals with the negotiation process from a game theory perspective. On a 
negotiation model based on Nash bargaining problem, it demonstrates how to achieve 
greater utility and its division, or in a simplified form, division of a higher yield.  
 
The graphical form of the model helps to understand the way negotiations takes place and 
some aspects of it. The problem of subjective assessment of reality can be largely addressed 
by the negotiation process.  
 
Understanding the role of subjectivity in bargaining allows to improve your own bargaining 
skills and gain more in dividing the results achieved together. A proper set-up of the so-
called point of disagreement is the key to the advantage of good preparation.  
 
The findings are related to the structure of negotiation ensuing from the negotiation program 
at Harvard Law School. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In article titled “Analysis Tools of Connecting Investment Opportunities and 
Investment Means in the Area of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises” (Valenčík 
and Červenka, 2016) an apparatus is presented, which analyses the relations between 
owners of investment opportunities and owners of financial resources. This 
negotiation can be generalized and converted into the so-called Nash bargaining 
problem and, for further analysis, use the tools of this part of game theory. 
Understanding the division of patterns and factors that influence the size of the 
subjects’ share is a prerequisite for the subsequent practical use of this knowledge. 
 
The aim of this contribution is to propose a negotiation model and to select the 
theoretical solution that best meets practical requirements. Next, it is to apply the 
model and then use it to demonstrate some aspects of negotiation that are not 
entirely clear and which can contribute to increasing the bargaining power of small 
and medium-sized business. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
In the area of involving game theory in bargaining, basic theoretical sources are 
based on the work of Nash (1950), who defined the negotiation problem in game 
theory, including axioms, and also contributed to the solution of this problem. 
Subsequently, other authors find other possible solutions that correspond to the 
changed axioms for the solution. These include Raiffa (1953), Kalai and 
Smorodinsky (1975) and Kalai (1977). Kıbrıs (2010) clearly processed the 
development of negotiation solutions. 
 
The negotiation process has been alternatively studied at Harvard Law School, a 
faculty of law, since 1983. The basic principles of negotiation, on which the 
programme is built, are summarized in the well-known book “Getting to Yes” 
(Fisher and Ury, 1987). Ury and other authors then develop these basic principles for 
different situations, such as overcoming disagreement (Ury, 2015), and so on. An 
interesting criticism of this project is offered by a former FBI chief negotiator, who 
built his bargaining skills on the basis of many practical experiences. From his own 
experience and detailed analysis of bargaining, he concludes that academic studies 
are inadequate in real practice because of their excessive emphasis on rationality. He 
argues and practically demonstrates that emotions play an irreplaceable role in the 
negotiations, which ultimately have a decisive word in concluding agreements. 
(Voss and Raz, 2016). 
 
The article builds on previous articles dealing with this field, especially “Analysis of 
Financial Markets Evolution by Utilizing the Theory of Cooperative Game” 
(Valenčík et al., 2015a), “The Fourth Industrial Revolution or the Economics of 
Productive Services?” (Valenčík et al., 2015b), “Phenomenon of a "Snag" in 
financial markets and its analysis via the cooperative game theory“ (Černík and 
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Valenčík, 2016), and “Analysis tools of connecting investment opportunities and 
investmen tmeans in the area ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises“ (Valenčík and 
Červenka, 2016), which deal with the negotiation between financial providers and 
owners of investment opportunities and related issues. 
 
3. Material and Methods 
 
The article uses an exploration method that is common in field of game theory. It 
uses the model of this situation/game to analyse the strategic situation. It examines 
how the model behaves under changed conditions and compares outputs with known 
theories and behaviour of negotiation participants. From these comparisons it then 
derives conclusions. In this contribution, Nash's bargaining problem is used as a 
model. The model is further used to analyse the impacts of an individual view of the 
bargaining situation and to determine the importance of setting the point of 
disagreement at the start of negotiations. The model conclusions relate to the 
theoretical framework of the Harvard negotiation programme. 
 
3.1 Nash's bargaining problem 
 
For a deeper analysis of the negotiating situation, two entities with different 
interests, leading to the negotiation of agreement, are considered. It is intended to 
provide both parties with some benefits and the subsequent distribution thereof. A 
cooperative game apparatus, namely the Nash's bargaining problem is used (Nash, 
1950). As Nash states, virtually every bargaining is a form of achievement and 
distribution of benefits. Such a negotiation situation can be viewed as a set of 
possible combinations of the division of the jointly obtained benefits from all 
possible arrangement of the subjects, with the point of disagreement d, which 
determines the subset of the set S, within which the solution will be sought, see 
Figure1: 
 
Figure 1: Negotiation as a Nash’s bargaining problem 
 
Source: Authors, based on Nash (1950). 
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The point of disagreement identifies a solution, on which both negotiating parties 
agree without further negotiation - this is the result of the first proposal. 
Alternatively, the negotiation is the result of alternatives available to both parties - 
hence it is not worth a bargain for a lower benefit than that defined by point (d). The 
point of disagreement may also be located at the intersection of axes (x, y) if both 
sides do not agree and have no alternative options, i.e., even small improvements are 
beneficial for both entities. 
 
The curve bounded by the set S represents utility-possibility frontier, a set of Pareto 
efficient combinations, where one can no longer improve one subject without the 
second subject doing worse. It is worth pointing out that the model works with the 
concept of utility, which is a subjectively perceived benefit. It includes not only 
quantifiable incomes, but also their subjective importance and a number of other 
factors that affect bargaining, such as emotions. This knowledge is very important 
for understanding of the negotiation process - even a seemingly mutually beneficial 
agreement can be utterly frustrated if discourteous behaviour occurs during the 
negotiations whereby one party feels offended. Subjectively perceived damage may 
be higher than the subjective benefit of a financial gain. On the contrary, good 
personal relationships and a professional approach, for example, towards cultural 
differences of negotiation, can increase the benefit of the agreement. Because of the 
difficulty in quantifying utility its usually replaced by more easily quantifiable 
variables such as revenue, which will also be the quantity further used in this work, 
for a better idea of the outcome of the negotiation. It is still good to keep in mind the 
possibility of an inaccurate interpretation of the situation. 
 
Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem is an exact solution based on various, in 
practice, unrealistic assumptions. These include, for example, perfect information, 
equal bargaining skills, knowledge of the power of negotiation, etc. In his “The 
Bargaining Problem” (Nash, 1950), J. Nash proposes a solution that lies at the so-
called Nash product, which can be found according to the formula: 
 
max [u1(x
*) – u1(x
0)] [u2(x
*) – u2(x
0)]       (1) 
 
where u1 and u2 are utilities of the first and second subject, point x
0 corresponds to 
the benefit at the point of disagreement and the point x* at the point of interest. 
Thus, the formula represents the maximization of the benefit that entities can obtain. 
 
Another described approach comprises the dictatorial approach where one entity 
gains all the benefits. In practice, it is not easy to achieve this outcome in the 
negotiations. In a free environment, even an egalitarian solution is not always 
rational, proposing division equally (Kalai, 1977), regardless of the contribution of 
the parties to the outcome. The last of the commonly cited solutions is the Kalai-
Smorodinsky approach (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). From the viewpoint of 
application in the corporate sphere it seems to be the most usable - it can be 
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interpreted as a division taking into account the relative contribution of individual 
subjects to the joint result, as graphically illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Kalai-Smorodinski solution to bargaining problem 
 
Source: Authors, based on (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). 
 
where y(1) and y(2) represent the proceeds of the first and the second subject, a point 
KS of the Kalai-Smorodinski solution with revenues yKS(1) and yKS(2) for both 
subjects.  
 
Kalai-Smorodinski solution corresponds to the generally understood model of a fair 
division according to the merits, corresponds to the common division within 
agreements between entities and therefore we will use it further for the graphic 
demonstration of some aspects of the negotiations. 
 
All of these solutions to the negotiation problem in the original version are a 
mathematical discipline with many assumptions difficult to obtain in practice. 
However, the bargaining model can also be successfully used in its graphical form to 
illustrate the negotiating situation and to demonstrate various factors that affect the 
process and outcome of negotiations.  
 
3.1 Harvard negotiation programme 
 
The Negotiation Center, which has been involved in research on the negotiation 
process since 1983, is situated at Harvard Law School. The research is based on the 
basic principles described by Fisher and Ury, co-founder of the Harvard Negotiation 
Center, in their book “Getting to yes” (1987). It is mainly about concentrating on 
solving the problem as the opposite of addressing the problem, i.e., instead of 
describing what is wrong, the focus moves on to finding solutions and finding 
mutually beneficial solutions. The specific basic recommendations are subsequently: 
 
1. Separate the people from the problem;  
2. Focus on interests, not positions; 
3. Invent options for mutual gain;  
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4. Insist on objective criteria (Fisher and Ury, 1987). 
 
Another important idea that Fisher and Ury (1987) introduced comprises the role of 
the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). BATNA is related to 
the preparation for negotiations. It means clarification of the alternative options of 
the negotiating entity, i.e., what is the minimum outcome of bargaining that 
overcomes these alternatives. It can be said that the Harvard negotiation programme 
today by its principles represents the mainstream of bargaining tactics. 
 
Another valid perspective and criticism of the Harvard project in 2006 is provided 
by Chris Voss, the former FBI chief negotiator. He has built his bargaining skills on 
the basis of many practical experiences. After negotiating surprisingly successfully 
in the bargaining role plays against the experienced lecturers of the project and their 
students, he literally states: “... no matter how we dress up our negotiations in 
mathematical theories, we are always an animal, always acting and reacting first 
and foremost from our deeply held but mostly invisible and inchoate fears, needs, 
perceptions, and desires. That’s not how these folks at Harvard leamed it, though. 
Their theories and techniques all had to do with intellectual power, logic ... They 
had a script to follow, a predetermined sequence of actions, offers, and 
counteroffers designed in a specific order to bring about a particular outcome. It 
was as if they were dealing with a robot ...” (Voss and Raz, 2016). This is, in other 
words, a confirmation of the fact that if we simplify the negotiating task and start 
using the yield or other obvious value instead of the utility, we can overlook the 
significant intangible benefit for some of the entities. 
 
3.2 Incomplete information and subjectivity in information evaluation 
 
During practical negotiations, in business practice, we encounter a fundamental 
problem - how to get information, how to evaluate them, how and at which stage of 
negotiation can we use them. Many information is unavailable or are out-dated, 
incomplete, unreliable, inaccurate, etc. Moreover, each of the negotiators has only a 
limited view of the current situation, interpreting the information available 
differently. Fall in the stock exchange is a reason for someone to leave the market, 
while others see it as an opportunity for cheaper purchases. It is clear that the 
evaluation of future revenues will, to a large extent, be individual and subjective 
even in case of known actual variables (Thalassinos et al., 2012a; 2012b). They will 
depend on expectations of future developments and other influences such as 
availability of investment funds, alternative investment options, etc. The same is true 
of the assessment of investment projects in the SME environment. 
 
Another individual factor that needs to be considered comprises synergy effects, i.e., 
consideration of the impact of the agreement on the future negotiating position and 
the possibilities of the entity. In business practice, there is a situation where it is 
rational to conclude even a loss-making agreement, provided this agreement 
provides some, though at that moment financially uncharted, benefits (Bondarenko 
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et al., 2017. An example might be to gain a customer, who will enable to enter a new 
market, provide an important reference, etc. A narrowly conceived yield may be 
negative at that time, but the subjectively perceived benefit will be positive. 
 
Individual assessment of the situation should also be taken into account when 
negotiating. If the two sides begin to negotiate, their views on the possible returns 
from a concluded agreement may vary considerably. Everyone has their own 
perception of possible returns and their distribution, its own set S (Figure 3): 
 
Figure  3. Different views on future possible returns of subjects 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
Negotiation contributes to the exchange of information, influencing the perception 
of the other subject, convergence of opinions. Thus, the differences between the 
perceptions of the reality of both subjects diminish (Figure 4): 
 
Figure 4. Convergence of the realities of both parties by negotiation 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
In case there is no unification of the views of both parties, different situations may 
occur. If both entities are rather pessimistic in anticipation of possible revenue 
distributions, i.e., they will perceive possible agreements rather more advantageous 
for the other one, the future agreement will lie in the penetration of individual S sets 
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of both subjects. In other words, both parties will seek only an agreement that is 
realistic in their view and the limitation according to Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5. Penetration of sets of possible revenue distributions 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
In case of an optimistic assessment of the situation, the subjects will be inclined to a 
broader perception of the possibilities and together they can develop a new common 
set S(1,2) (Figure 6): 
 
Figure 6. New common set of possible revenue distributions 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
In cases where the agreement is very attractive for one party, while the other party 
hesitates, doubts the advantage from its point of view, it is possible to use a 
combination of compensations or guarantees as a motivation. In this way, the agreed 
yield can also be secured for the questioning party and allow for an agreement. 
 
The Harvard negotiation programme deals with the same issue in the way that it 
emphasizes the full understanding of the interests of the other party and the search 
for alternatives that bring the greatest benefit to both parties. Ideally, there is a blend 
of reality and extension of possibilities. From the experience of the authors of this 
work it is not easy for less experienced negotiators to understand the concept of 
      Negotiation in SMEs’ Environment Analysis with Game Theory Tools 
    
 112  
 
 
individual understanding of reality, and the approach described in this chapter could 
contribute to accepting different concepts of reality in others.  
 
3.3 Meaning and setting up the point of disagreement 
 
The commencement of the negotiation process is of great importance for 
negotiation; in Nash’s bargaining problem setting the point of disagreement. We 
demonstrate the importance of this setting on the bargaining model with a 
breakdown based on the benefit to the jointly achieved yield (Kalai-Smorodinského 
solution) see Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. The significance of setting point of disagreement 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
where KS1, KS2 a KS3 are agreements ensuing from points of disagreement d1, d2 a 
d3. Points y(1)1, y(1)2a y(1)3 represent the revenues achieved by the first entity. 
 
It is obvious that for the first subject it is preferable to reject any initial d1 conditions 
and negotiate from the basic parameters d2. Thereby, we reach higher proceeds 
y(1)2. If he could convince the other entity during negotiation that his contribution is 
relatively lower and thus move the point of disagreement to point d3, then he will 
achieve an even higher yield y(1)3. In the bargaining practice this situation is related 
to the so-called anchoring technique. The negotiator starts with an unrealistic claim, 
which he then discards. For the other side, the finally  negotiated agreement seems 
to be advantageous compared to the original unrealistic requirement. 
 
Also, the BATNA (Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement) concept is related to 
setting the point of objection. From the point of view of the other subject in the 
example above - if, on the basis of preparation, the entity knows that its BATNA 
corresponds to the proceeds from the d1 disagreement, then it rejects the efforts to 
move the point of disagreement or terminate the negotiations altogether. Therefore, 
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it is important not to underestimate the preparation and examine the alternative 
options before the negotiations take place. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
The text provides a way to clearly analyse bargaining between two entities and 
applies this model to bargaining to the corporate environment as well. As the most 
usable mathematical solution to the bargaining problem for the business area appears 
the Kalai-Smorodinski solution for its interpretation is based on merit distribution 
and easy application to a real environment. It clearly demonstrates the dependence 
of negotiations on the subjective assessment of both the current situation and the 
future development, as well as the possibility of influencing this perception through 
negotiation. At the same time, the text analyses the impact of the different points of 
disagreement and suggests options for its control. 
 
What remains to be discussed is whether it is suitable to elaborate in detail the 
individual conclusions and to make some detailed, ideally mathematically based 
conclusions based on observation and evaluation of real bargaining situations in 
corporate practice. It is theoretically possible that because of the high degree of 
subjectivity and individuality of the assessment of well-known situations, an exact 
apparatus will not produce desired results in the terms of more accuracy. The 
authors of the article are convinced that the graphic form of the individual 
negotiating situations helps to understand the relationships between subjects and the 
dynamics of the negotiations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The so-called Nash’s negotiation problem can be used to graphically illustrate the 
negotiation process. For the practice of small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
Kalai-Smorodinski solution appears to be the most appropriate theoretical approach 
to the so-called negotiating problem. This solution can be interpreted in a clear way 
as a breakdown of revenues depending on the benefits of the acting entities, and in 
essence it is a reduction of bargaining for a revenue sharing agreement. This can 
form a basis of the agreement even at the moment of uncertain revenue. At the same 
time, the agreement can be enriched by some other provisions, such as different 
coverage of different input costs and other parameters that provide sufficient 
flexibility according to the required conditions. 
 
One of the main challenges in real bargaining comprises ignorance of all information 
and subjective evaluation of information known to the public. This factually leads to 
the creation of individual models of negotiating reality. The process of negotiating 
will influence and probably converge both realities. Because of the individual 
models of reality, the setting of a good starting position for negotiation is important; 
therefore, it is important to prepare for negotiations with the identification of 
alternative options, both for themselves and for others, and to prepare a suitable 
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strategy. This way you can get an advantage right at the beginning of the 
negotiations. This way, the contribution has met its goals and with its practical focus 
it can be beneficial to the corporate sphere to improve both individual and team 
negotiation processes. Additional research will be focused on obtaining relevant data 
to confirm the above conclusions. 
 
Acknowledgement: 
 
Contribution supported by funds institutional support for the long-term conceptual 
development of the research organization of the University of Finance and 
Administration. 
 
References: 
 
Bondarenko, G.T., Isaeva, A.E., Orekhov, S.A., Soltakhanov, U.A. 2017.  Optimization of 
the Company Strategic Management System in the Context of Economic Instability. 
European Research Studies Journal, 20(2B), 3-24. 
Černík, O. and Valenčík, R. 2016. Phenomenon of a "Snag" in financial markets and its 
analysis via   the cooperative game theory. Contributions to Game Theory and 
Management, 9, 102-117. 
Fisher, R. and Ury, W. 1987. Getting to yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in 
(Arrow ed.). London: Arrow Books Limited. 
Kalai, E. 1977. Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: interpersonal utility 
comparisons: interpersonal utility comparisons. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 45(7), 1623-1630. 
Kalai, E. and Smorodinsky, M. 1975. Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 43(3), 513-518. 
Kıbrıs, Ö. 2010. Cooperative game theory approaches to negotiation. In Handbook of Group 
Decision and Negotiation, Springer, 151-166.  
Nash, J.F. 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 
18(2), 155-162. 
Raiffa, H. 1953. Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games. Annals of 
Mathematics Studies, (28), 361-387. 
Thalassinos, I.E., Hanias, P.M. and Curtis, G.P. 2012a. Time series prediction with neural 
networks for the Athens Stock Exchange indicator. European Research Studies Journal, 
15(2), 23-31. 
Thalassinos, I.E., Ugurlu, E. and Muratoglu, Y. 2012b. Income Inequality and Inflation in the 
EU. European Research Studies Journal, 15(1), 127-140. 
Valenčík, R., Černík, O., Červenka, J. and Mihola, J. 2015. Analysis of Financial Markets 
Evolution by Utilizing the Theory of Cooperative Games. In V. Pavlát and O. 
Schlossberger, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on “Financial Markets 
within the Globalization of World Economy", Prague, VŠFS EUPRESS, 36-46.  
Valenčík, R. and Červenka, J. 2016. Analysis tools of connecting investment opportunities 
and investment means in the area of small and medium-sized enterprises. European 
Research Studies Journal, 19(4), 130-139. 
Voss, C. and Raz, T. 2016. Never Split the Difference: Negotiating as if your Life Depended 
on it. New York, Harper Collins. 
 
